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4ABSTRACT
This report is a part of the project “Minimizing Risks of Maritime Oil Transport by Holistic 
Safety Strategies” (MIMIC) work package 3. Work package 3 (WP3) is concentrated on maritime 
security issues, especially the identification of security threats and evaluation of security risks in the 
Baltic Sea area. In the previous phases of WP3, literature review was published on general security 
issues in 2012 and a report of the results of an interview and survey study was published in 2013.  
This report is a continuation to the previous reports. In this report, the general views on maritime 
security are examined, and the most essential measures for security threats from MIMIC 
WP3’s perspective are introduced. Material for this study has been collected by means of theme 
interviews, web-based survey, Delphi study and workshops.
At the moment, the Baltic Sea region is a relatively stable, peaceful and controlled area. However, 
based on the results of the study, it seems the security threats, such as smuggling of weapons or 
drugs, thefts, vandalism, human trafficking and smuggling, violent crimes, illegal fishing, illegal 
discharge and illegal environmental activism occur in the Baltic Sea region. Still, the prevalence 
for the most of these threats is low. Smuggling of drugs and weapons and human trafficking in the 
Baltic Sea are problems that should be noticed.
In conclusion, the situational awareness and national and international co-operation between the 
authorities and other actors seem to greatly contribute to the overall security. Situation awareness 
and co-operation help the Baltic Sea states to better prepare for security threats, existing as well 
as potential ones, and thus guarantee a safe living environment for the people in the Baltic Sea 
region.
5TIIVISTELMÄ
Raportti liittyy ”Minimizing risks of maritime oil transport by holistic safety strategies” (MIMIC) 
– projektin työpaketti kolmeen, joka keskittyy merenkulun turvauhkien (security) tunnistamiseen 
ja riskien arvioimiseen Itämeren alueella. MIMIC -projektissa on aikaisemmin julkaistu kirjallisuus-
katsaus (2012) sekä haastattelu- ja kyselytutkimuksen tuloksia käsittelevä raportti (2013).
Tämä raportti on jatkoa tutkimuksen aikaisemmille raporteille ja tässä raportissa käsitellään ylei-
siä näkökulmia merenkulun turvauhkiin, esitellään MIMIC –projektin työpaketin 3 tutkimuksen 
perusteella tärkeimmät merenkulun turvauhkien (security) hallintakeinot. Tutkimuksessa tiedon-
keruumenetelminä on käytetty haastattelu-, kysely- ja Delfoi-tutkimusta sekä asiantuntijoiden työ-
pajoja.
Itämeren alue on tällä hetkellä melko vakaa, rauhallinen ja valvottu alue. Kuitenkin tutkimuksen 
tulosten perusteella voidaan sanoa, että turvauhkia, kuten aseiden salakuljetusta, huumeiden sala-
kuljetusta, varkauksia, ilkivaltaa, ihmiskauppaa ja ihmisten salakuljetusta, väkivaltarikoksia, laitonta 
kalastusta, laittomia päästöjä ja laitonta ympäristöaktivismia, esiintyy Itämeren alueella. Suurim-
maksi osaksi näiden uhkien esiintyvyys on kuitenkin vähäistä. Huomioitavia ongelmia Itämeren 
alueella ovat huumeiden ja aseiden salakuljetus sekä ihmiskauppa.
Johtopäätöksenä voidaan sanoa, että tilannekuvan havainnollistaminen ja kansallinen ja kansain-
välinen yhteistyö viranomaisten ja muiden toimijoiden kesken on erittäin tärkeää merenkulun ko-
konaisturvallisuuden kannalta. Tilannetietoisuuden ja yhteistyön avulla Itämeren jäsenvaltioilla on 
valmiudet varautua turvauhkiin, niin olemassa oleviin kuin mahdollisiin uusiin uhkiin ja näin taata 
Itämeren alueen ihmisille turvallinen elinympäristö.
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 AEO   EU Authorized Economic Operator 
 AIS   Automatic Identification System
 CBSS   Council of Baltic Sea States
 C-PAT   Customs Trade Partnerships Against Terrorism
 CSI  Container Security Initiative
 IMO   International Maritime Organization
 ISPS Code International Code for the Security of Ships and Port Facilities
 LRIT   Long Range Identification and Tracking system
 MSCA   Maritime Security Co-operation and Awareness
 STCW   Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
 Trafi   Finnish Transport Safety Agency
 VTT   Technical Research Centre of Finland
91 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The Baltic Sea connects the Baltic Sea states to Continental Europe and the rest of the world, 
and it is a key transportation route. Maritime transport is of vital importance for Baltic Sea states. 
Especially, it is a crucial transport mode for Finland and Sweden and the most important mode for 
Denmark and Russia. (Breitzmann, 2013.)
The Baltic Sea is one of the world’s busiest seas; vessel traffic has increased dramatically in recent 
years although the present economical regression has restricted it. A “motor for the increase” is 
mainly Russia. For example, nearly 60 percent of the tanker transport is Russian export. All types 
of cargoes can be found in the Baltic Sea, of which liquid goods present the highest transport 
volumes. Container shipping has been the most rapidly increased form of transport during the last 
years (Breitzmann, 2013). 
The area has been peaceful and stable, but on the other hand it has now also become an important 
area in terms of political importance and security, and the Baltic Sea is not excluded from the 
developments and trends of the global security. The occurrence of obstacles to seafaring in the 
Baltic Sea area could cause significant problems for the states’ maintenance and supply security. 
The sea area is also heavily polluted and cannot withstand any extra load from the possible 
shipping accidents. When planning matters related to safety and security must be taken into 
account more and more all the factors that threaten the safety and security; not only on the 
human factor or accidents causing natural damages, but also on the threats caused by illegal and 
intentional acts. 
1.2 The purpose and structure of the report
This report is a part of work package 3 of the project “Minimizing risks of maritime oil transport 
by holistic safety strategies” (MIMIC) whose main focus is on maritime security, especially threat 
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identification and risk assessment in the Baltic Sea area (more about MIMIC on appendix 1). The 
main objective of this report is to present the phases of the MIMIC project WP 3 and combine 
and discuss the results of the studies. Also, the purpose is to present the security measures that 
according to the authorities and experts were the most essential when managing security issues in 
the Baltic Sea region. 
The material for this study was collected by different ways: theme interviews, web-based survey, 
Delphi study and workshops. The results of the previous phases of this study (literature review, 
interviews, web-based survey) were presented in reports which were published in 2012 and 2013. 
The current report will present the results of Delphi survey and security threat analysis model for 
MIMIC by VTT. 
This report contains seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents some background information and 
specifies the purpose, limitations and definitions of the report. Chapter 2 outlines the general 
aspects on maritime security and special security factors in the Baltic Sea region. Chapter 3 
describes how the material was collected and how the study was implemented (Delphi survey, 
interviews and survey and workshops). In chapter 4, the mapping of security threats is presented, 
and the results of the study are discussed. Chapter 5 contains the presentation of an analysis model 
for Mimic, and chapter 6 introduces the maritime security measures which are based on the results 
of the Delphi study. The conclusions are presented at the end of the report.
1.3 Limitations and definitions
In this chapter, the limitations to and essential definitions used in the study will be presented.
Limitations. The study of WP 3 is concentrated on maritime security in the Baltic Sea area, 
particularly the focus is on Finland. For this study, the security threats were divided into nine 
categories: destruction of the marine environment (illegal pollution and emissions), illegal fishing, 
smuggling and trafficking of illicit drugs, smuggling and trafficking of weapons, human smuggling 
and trafficking, piracy, terrorism, environmental activist, vandalism and theft. More information 
about the threats can be found in the reports “Maritime safety and security -Literature review” by 
Fransas, Nieminen, Salokorpi & Rytkönen, 2012, and “Maritime Security and safety threats – Study 
in the Baltic Area” by Fransas, Nieminen, Salokorpi, 2013.
Definitions. Del Pozo, Dymock, Feldt, Hebrard and Monteforte (2010, 45-46) define maritime 
security and safety as follows:
 Security: “The combination of preventive and responsive measures to protect the   
   maritime domain against threats and intentional unlawful acts.” 
 Safety:  “The combination of preventive measures intended to protect the maritime  
   domain against, and limit the effect of accidental or natural danger, harms,  
   damage to environment, risk or loss.”
11
The concept of threat has been defined by Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (2007, 27) as 
follows:
“Threat is a based on a group’s (or subject’s) intent and capability and is a measure of how likely the 
success in carrying out some activity that may cause harm.”
Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (2007, 25) defined the risk as follows:
“Risk refers to the uncertainty that future events and outcomes. It is measured in terms of likelihood 
and harm (consequences) of an event with the potential to influence the achievement of an important 
objective.”
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2 MARITIME SECURITY IN THE BALTIC 
SEA REgION
First in this chapter, some general security aspects are examined followed by a discussion of 
security factors in the Baltic Sea region.
2.1 Security aspects
Maritime safety and security is managed by a number of international and national laws, 
regulations, and guidelines (Reinman, Silla, Heikkilä, Pietikäinen & Luoma 2012, 16). Security 
and safety differ from each other by the issue of willfulness of the act. Deliberate malignity acts 
are regarded as security issues. According to Mallia (2010, 1): “Maritime security is understood to 
include the preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the maintenance of peace and order, 
so as to ensure the safety and protection of ships together their passengers, crews and cargoes, and the 
protection of property and the environment”.
Maritime security at sea continues to be threatened in many ways, for example the movement 
of terrorists and their means of financing, and the shipment of weapons of mass destruction 
and conventional arms, the smuggling of drugs and migrants, piracy and armed robbery at sea 
(Roach 2004, 41). When criminal activity is concerned, all threats to maritime security have one 
remarkable mutual feature: the transnational link. Criminal organizations are able to operate 
globally due to the fact that it is considerably easy to cross borders and a majority of legislative 
instruments and resources are limited by state boundaries. New existing transnational threats are 
being recognized, and these challenges have highlighted the value of international cooperation in 
ensuring maritime security and the need for a coordinated approach. (Mallia 2010, 1.)
2.2 Security factors in the Baltic Sea region
Because security is a complex matter, the Baltic Sea region has its advantages and challenges but 
still it might be a good example on how security cooperation between countries can develop in 
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the time of peace and stability. Between the Nordic countries, cooperation related to security has a 
long tradition although the security preferences have often been different. (Mölder 2006, 8, 27.) 
Along with the interdependence of the global growth, the countries’ external and internal security 
has become increasingly interconnected. The threats that cross borders such as terrorism, drug and 
human trafficking, infectious diseases, environmental threats, energy outages and cyber-attacks are 
emphasized. Increasingly, the Baltic countries prepare for disruptions by international cooperation. 
(Valtioneuvoston kanslia 2012, 23.)
Mölder, H. writes in the article “NATO’s Role in the Post-Modern European Security 
Environment, Cooperative Security and the Experience of the Baltic Sea Region” (2006, 26) that 
“the advantage of the Baltic Sea region is that the region has traditionally been peaceful. Wars between 
Baltic Sea states have been rare during the last centuries. Today, there are only some potential conflict 
areas, but lesser predictability for the emergence of violence. The possible threats for the region include 
mostly asymmetrical threats like environmental issues, economic issues, migration, etc.”
A well-established co-operation in the Baltic Sea region, in particular the Council of Baltic Sea 
States (CBSS) framework, benefits the environment, the economy, transport, research and other 
sectors of society. Baltic coastal states have a common interest in keeping the transport route open, 
free of accidents, clean and functional. This supports the stability of the region. (Valtioneuvoston 
kanslia, 2012, 64.)
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3 COLLECTION OF MATERIAL AND 
IMpLEMENTATION OF THE STUDY
In the research of work package 3, empirical materials on maritime security threats were 
collected by means of theme interviews, web-based survey, Delphi survey and workshops. In this 
chapter, the phases of the material collection are presented.
3.1 Interviews and survey
Information on security threats were collected by expert interviews and an electronic survey. The 
implementation of the interviews and the survey are discussed in this chapter. 
Interviews. The expert interviews were executed between December 2011 and September 2012. 
15 experts from 13 different organizations took part in the interviews. These experts represented 
ports, shipping companies, marine authorities, and other experts (fields such as education or 
scientific research).
The threat categories formed a base for the interviews and also served as a model for the interview 
form. The interview form was divided into nine main threat categories and their subgroups: 
destruction of the marine environment, illegal fishing, smuggling, stowaways, piracy, terrorism, 
environmental activism, vandalism, and theft.
The aim of the interviews was to identify the nature of each threat and the potential place for the 
threat to occur, and to complete a risk analysis for security and safety matters. Also, the interviews 
aimed to distinguish between potential and occurred threat scenarios. 
Survey. The web-based survey was executed in the Baltic Sea countries in the autumn of 2012. The 
threat categories used in the interviews served as the base of the survey. The main categories in the 
survey were intentional pollution, illegal emission, illegal fishing, smuggling, stowaways, piracy, 
terrorism, illegal environmental activism, vandalism, pilferage and homicide. The survey was sent 
to 44 people with expertise in maritime related matters in the Baltic Sea countries but only seven 
answers were received. The respondents were from Estonia, Germany, Finland and Sweden. 
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3.2 Delphi study
Delphi technique has been defined in many ways. Linstone and Turoff (1975, 3) defined Delphi 
method as follows: “Delphi may be characterized as a method for structuring a group communication 
process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a 
complex problem”.
The Delphi technique was initially intended to produce a consensus of opinions among experts 
with successive questionnaires and controlled feedback. (Kuusi 2003, 207). According to 
Wouldenberg (1991, 133) the characteristics of Delphi are anonymity, iteration and feedback.
Implementation. The Delphi survey was conducted at the beginning of 2013 with a network 
program developed by Otavan opisto (Finnish academy) which was planned to utilize the Delphi 
expert method. The Delphi was focused on maritime security threats, maritime security measures, 
and other security-related factors of the Baltic Sea area. 
In Delphi survey, a group of experts is called a panel. For this particular survey, eleven experts from 
Finland representing different organizations were selected to the panel. The panelists included 
authorities, representatives of educational, port and shipping organizations as well as other experts 
in the field. The panelists constituted a versatile and also an experienced group of experts.
The Delphi study consisted of three rounds. The aim of the first round was to clarify the 
interpretations of the expert interviews. Two different sections were included in the first round. 
First, the panelists were asked to map the threats and give their evaluations of the impact and 
likelihood of the threats in the Baltic Sea area. The list of threats consisted of destroying the marine 
environment/illegal discharges into the sea, illegal fishing, drug smuggling, smugglings of weapons, 
equipment and components, human smuggling, human trafficking, piracy, terrorism, capital and 
violence crimes, illegal environmental activism, theft and vandalism. Then the panelists were asked 
to discuss and comment on the presented arguments.
The most interesting topics from the first round were summarized in the second round, and 
the panelists were asked to give their opinions and arguments on them. The second round also 
contained questions about risk management methods for each threat. The last round gave the 
panelists an opportunity to comment on the summaries of the previous rounds and define 
maritime security measures. Thus, the results of the first and second rounds were further clarified 
and supported.
3.3 Workshops 
The material was also collected by arranging workshops: one workshop in Kotka and two 
workshops in Helsinki. In addition, a meeting with Russian maritime security experts was held 
in October 2012 during Gulf of Finland Maritime Assembly with the purpose to discuss security 
threats and their risk control options. 
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A workshop on the identification of threats was held in Kotka in May, 2012. The list of security 
threats and preliminary outcomes of the expert interviews related to security threats were 
presented. The experts estimated if any of the threat scenarios was relevant in the Baltic Sea area. 
The main purpose of the workshop was to discuss and analyze the information obtained by the 
interviews. In addition, the future measures of the project were discussed.
A workshop on the identification and evaluation of the threats was held in Helsinki in August, 
2012. The aim of the workshop was to examine the maritime security factors and policies that 
have a primary impact to security. In addition, factors of maritime security were determined, and 
the primary impact to the security was examined. 
A workshop on maritime security risk management was held in Helsinki in June, 2013. The 
workshop was related to the security aspects of WP3, and a few threats to violate the security were 
highlighted. Four aspects were selected for more detailed discussion: terrorism, piracy, smuggling 
of drugs and weapons and illegal fishing. Also, VTT’s security threat analysis model for the 
MIMIC project was presented.
17
4 MAppINg OF MARITIME SECURITY 
THREATS
The mapping of maritime security threats in the Baltic Sea region was based on the analysis of 
the results of the interviews of Finnish maritime authorities and experts, web-based survey for the 
authorities and experts for Baltic Sea area, Delphi study for the Finnish maritime authorities and 
experts and the information collected from workshops. The results from the interviews and survey 
were examined in the previous report “Maritime Security and safety threats – Study in the Baltic 
Area” by Fransas, Nieminen, Salokorpi, 2013. Some main results of the Delphi study are presented 
in the following subchapter and the discussion about all the results is placed after it.
4.1 Results of the Delphi study
The phases of Delphi study are presented in chapter 3.1. The Delphi study focused on the 
following threat categories: destruction of the marine environment, illegal fishing, smuggling, 
stowaways, piracy, terrorism, environmental activism, vandalism and theft.
Illegal discharges were considered to be a problem to some extent, for example the temptation to 
release small amount of oily waters is high, although the surveillance has reduced emissions. The 
probability to be caught and penalized is still minor. Also, the understanding of the influences of 
discharges to environment, especially to the Baltic Sea, has not yet reached everyone. According 
to panelists, the security measures for illegal discharges include authority surveillance, rules and 
regulations, contracts, inspections, sanctions and affordable and efficient waste management. 
Matters related to illegal fishing raised different opinions, but still it was estimated to be a minor 
problem in the Baltic Sea area. Some of the panelists thought that illegal fishing is a problem, 
and others commented that although it happens the impacts are rather insignificant. Better 
surveillance, regulations, sanctions, accounting controls and general awareness were considered the 
security measures for illegal fishing. 
Most panelists estimated that drugs are smuggled in the Baltic Sea. Cargo vessels, especially 
container ships, are the most probable mode for illegal transport, but drugs are also transported, 
especially in the Schengen area, through internal passenger ship traffic. The significance of 
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this phenomenon to maritime safety and security was estimated low due to the fact that often 
seafarers are not aware they have contraband cargo. The security measures for drug smuggling are 
surveillance, intelligence, national and international co-operation between authorities, regulations 
and the means to address the problem in the country of origin.
According to some panelists, small amounts of weapons are smuggled in the Baltic Sea, and the 
free movement of goods inside the Schengen area increases the amount of weapon smuggling. 
Panelists thought that although human trafficking is very rare in the Baltic Sea region it can be 
classified as a problem.  However, the connection of human trafficking to the seafaring is unclear. 
Land borders were considered to be the most common route. The most essential security measures 
to these threats are surveillance and intelligence.
Currently, the panelists did not consider piracy to be highly probable. The Baltic Sea is a closed 
and restricted area, which is why piracy is difficult to organize in the area. There are no triggers 
to encourage piracy because the overall conditions are good. The most essential security measures 
for piracy are security plans, international co-operation, training and authorities´ preparedness. 
A terroristic attack in the Baltic Sea was considered possible, even if currently unlikely, although 
the small size of the area and careful surveillance make terroristic actions difficult. Security plans, 
international co-operation, the exchange of information, training, preparedness, ISPS code, 
regulations, the increase of penalty scale, as well as removal of conditions for terrorism are the risk 
management methods against terrorism.
The panelists assessed that violent crimes occur in the Baltic Sea area, especially in passenger ships. 
It is also clear that theft, particularly small-scale, and vandalism occurs in the Baltic Sea, especially 
in passenger ships. The impacts on the maritime safety and security were considered low, mostly 
affecting the public image of sea travel. The most essential security measure against vandalism 
is surveillance. The security measures against thefts include surveillance, ships’ and shipping 
companies’ security plans, vigilance, increase of penalty scale, ISPS code, increasing the risk of 
being caught, and restrictions on the availability of alcohol.
The common opinion among the panelists was that illegal environmental activism occurs in the 
Baltic Sea area but no violence has been used. Environmental activism mainly causes problems 
such as public image issues, delays, and extra costs. The company policies affect the probability 
of being targeted by activists. Surveillance, such as access control and following the online 
discussions, were mentioned as the most essential security measures against illegal environment 
activism.
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4.2 Discussion of the study results
All the collected results can be processed in different ways depending on the viewpoint. The 
phenomenon this study is focused on has been examined mainly from the maritime point of view, 
but in some cases also from the perspective of society and business. The phenomenon can also be 
approached with focus on the realization of the threat; the severity of consequences, safety of life 
(human casualties), operative activities (business interruption, delays) and economic losses. 
The maritime security threats can be classified from the perspective of seafaring as presented in 
table below: a) direct attack causing harm to the ship/port/infra, b) exploitation of the ship/supply 
chain, c) harm to the marine environment, d) harm to passenger ships, e) seafarer’s involvement, 
and f ) other cases. Based on the received material, Table 1 below presents some viewpoints on 
seafaring with a focus on security threats.
Direct attack harm to the ship/port/infra: Exploiting the ship/supply chain:
• Terrorism
• piracy
• Illegal environmental activism
• Vandalism and theft 
• Smuggling of drugs, weapons, smuggling of 
goods 
• Human smuggling and trafficking 
Harm to the marine environment: In particular, the problems of  passenger ships:
• Illegal fishing
• Illegal emissions
• Illegal exploitation of natural resources 
• Crimes of violence
• Thefts and vandalism  
Seafarers involved: Other:
• Illegal emissions 
• Violations of marine rules 
• The potential threat in all categories 
• Economic crimes
• Unlabeled weapons and / or unreported    
transport
• Unmarked transport of chemicals 
• CBRN-threats  
One of the main aims of MIMIC study was to classify the maritime security threats and to study 
their occurrence in the Baltic Sea region. Figure 1 below illustrates the occurrence of maritime 
security threats in the Baltic Sea region. The threats which occur in the Baltic Sea region have been 
presented inside the blue ellipse. The prevalence of these threats varies.
Table 1 Classification of security threats from the perspective of seafaring
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Figure 1 Occurrence of security threats in the Baltic Sea region 
The collected security material suggested that the most serious threats are terroristic attacks and 
piracy (red ellipses in Figure 1), but their occurrence at the Baltic Sea has been low. Some kind 
of an attack, however, might be potential in the future, particularly if the attacks conducted by 
individuals are taken into account because the detection of preparation for such an attack is 
very difficult. Currently, there is no piracy at the Baltic Sea, and the probability of piracy was 
estimated lower than the probability of a terroristic attack. The Baltic Sea is quite a stable and well-
monitored area.
Other serious problem is the smuggling of drugs and weapons (colored in pink in Figure 1). 
It seems that smuggling of weapons is more systematic than has been assumed, but during 
the research it was noticed that the collection of data on this issue is quite difficult because 
civilians have no exact information and the authorities can only reveal what is considered public 
information. Therefore, the findings remained somewhat unclear. However, the free movement 
and open sea connections to the Baltic Sea states could increase the smuggling of weapons and also 
make drug smuggling (or the smuggling of any other substance) easier. Drugs are mostly smuggled 
in containers and Ro-Ro and Ro-Pax-vessels where the smuggled goods are easier to hide. 
Increasingly, they are also smuggled inside the luggage of an individual passenger. The smuggling 
of drugs is not a problem in seafaring unless it is not revealed during the transportation or at the 
port. However, from society’s point of view, the smuggling of drugs is a more serious problem. 
The mapping of maritime security threats is a general overview of the categories of threats that 
might occur in the Baltic Sea area. According to the collected material, the most significant 
threats are smuggling of drugs and weapons and human trafficking, but also attacks conducted by 
individuals. Human trafficking has no clear connection to seafaring and it is not a problem from 
the maritime point of view. The smuggling of goods generally does no harm to seafaring unless it 
is revealed during the transportation. More extensive summaries and analyses of security threats 
are made in a technical paper of the MIMIC WP 3 study that will not be published in any open 
source.
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5 ANALYSIS MODEL FOR MIMIC
Security threats can be estimated by the theoretical definition model which was developed for 
the purposes of MIMIC. Mainly, the model was meant to serve as a tool for strategic decision 
making, but if the model is used for more operational purposes, the user can define the model 
specifics and further develop the model.
The analysis model for MIMIC can be used as a security risk management method covering the 
proactive and reactive actions and also the actions taken after a threat has occurred. The security 
threat analysis model can also be understood as a visualization of security risk assessment.
5.1 Planning of analysis model
The planning of a security threat analysis model for MIMIC was started by determining 
methods for a security threat analysis and conducting literature survey (carried out by Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (VTT)). After that, VTT conducted the report on “Security threat 
analysis model for MIMIC project”. VTT was chosen as the provider of the literature review and 
security threat analysis model due to its long experience in research projects and maritime security 
matters. 
First of all, the MIMIC security threat analysis model is a theoretical definition model covering 
the field of research on different levels. It was created with an emphasis on an extensive overview 
of the definitions used in relation to maritime security threats. Because it is an overview of related 
analysis models, it requires operationalization. In this case, the operationalization is the conversion 
of definitions into measurable form implemented by computer software (Bayesian network 
model).
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5.2 Structure of model
The security threat analysis model is a generic framework for security threat analysis that 
structures the analysis process into three interconnected main modules or phases comprising 1. 
threat credibility module, 2. exploitation/vulnerability module, and 3. consequence module. The 
threat analysis framework is shown in figure 2. (Tuominen, 2013, 7.)
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Figure 2 Threat analysis framework model developed for MIMIC (Tuominen, 2013, 7)
The security threat analysis model for the MIMIC -project is applicable to security threat analysis 
from the viewpoint of individual facilities or locations (i.e. vessels and port terminals) as well as 
from the perspective of oil transport or marine transports in general (Tuominen, 2013, 6). Thus, 
the model can be applied by single users (different authorities, ports, shipping companies etc.) or it 
can be used on a very general level for the estimation of maritime security threats. 
Figure 3 describes the process and the interconnections between the threat credibility model, 
exploitation / vulnerability model and consequence model.
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Figure 3 Threat analysis process based on the threat analysis model for MIMIC (Tuominen, 2013, 28)
Figure 4 “Threat credibility model” for assessing the likelihood of realization of the different threat types on different 
target types in marine transport (Tuominen, 2013, 14) 
This study is concentrated on “Threat credibility model” part of the security threat analysis process. 
The variables of “Threat credibility model” are demonstrated in Figure 4, and the figure also 
illustrates the dependencies and relations between different variables.
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The usability of security threat analysis model on a general level has been discussed in workshops 
with the developer of MIMIC model (representative of VTT), and representatives of Kymenlaakso 
University of Applied Sciences and University of Helsinki. In the workshops, it was discussed how 
to operationalize the model and examined the states, dependencies and relations of variables. The 
security threat analysis model for MIMIC has been presented to the authorities and the potential 
users of the model. 
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6 MARITIME SECURITY MEASURES
This chapter examines the maritime security measures in general. The selected security measures 
are based on the results of the Delphi study including the most essential methods for managing 
the security issues in the Baltic Sea according to the authorities and experts involved in the Delphi 
study. 
6.1 National and international maritime security cooperation and 
awareness
Security cooperation is guided by international commitments and national legislation.  
(Valtonen 2010, 147).  When facing the increased threat of, for example, piracy, terrorism, illicit 
trade and illegitimate exploitation of marine resources, the international co-operation has become 
an essential step. In a domestic setting, different national agencies are mostly responsible for 
security awareness.
According to Peer (2012,5):  “To achieve awareness at a regional or even global level, many of the 
functions currently managed by individual nations will have to be undertaken by organizations 
which will enable all stakeholders to operate more efficiently and effective together”. In order to better 
understand maritime security co-operation and awareness (MSCA), activities can be organized in 
layers, figure 5. 
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Figure 5 The Layers of Maritime Cooperation and Awareness (Modified from peer 2012, 6)
The process of achieving Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) includes: “1. collection of 
information, 2. fusion of information from different resources, 3. analysis through the evaluation 
and interpretation of information, and 4. dissemination of information to decision makers, with the 
goal of identifying risks and threats before they turn into catastrophic events.” (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office 2010, 113.) 
6.2 Maritime surveillance conducted by authorities 
European Union (2010,7) defines maritime surveillance as follows: ”Maritime Surveillance is the 
effective understanding of all activities carried out at sea that could impact the security, safety, economy, 
or environment of the European Union and its Member States“. Furthermore, House of Commons 
Defense Committee (2012, 11) states that: “Maritime surveillance is a layered capability collecting 
information at a variety of levels: over a very wide domain using assets such as satellites; at a more 
precise theatre level using assets such as maritime patrol aircraft and ships; or in a specific area using 
assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters”.
The national level comprises national actors and also the information on sea areas produced 
by the authorities of neighboring countries. In Finland, maritime surveillance is based on a 
comprehensive control system which provides a national perspective of the sea. (Valtioneuvoston 
kanslia 2009, 49). 
Maritime surveillance aims to prevent violations of the territorial integrity. Surveillance and 
security of territorial integrity requires the identification and monitoring of the sea areas, in 
other words maritime awareness. Maritime awareness creates requirements for the prevention 
of violations and other offences related to the territorial surveillance and, if necessary, secure the 
launching of control operations related to territorial integrity and sea rescue. (Säkkinen 2011, 12.)
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6.3 ISPS Code
International Code for the Security of Ships and Port Facilities (ISPS) was prepared in New 
York 11 September 2001. The code is an amendment to the 1974 SOLAS Convention, and IMO 
adopted the code in December 2002. The code is used to create an international framework of 
cooperation in order to detect security threats and take measures to prevent security incidents in 
ships or port facilities used in international transport. (Söderblom 2004.)
The ISPS Code is a two -part document describing the minimum requirements for the security 
of ships and ports. Part A provides mandatory requirements and Part B provides guidance and 
recommendations for implementation. However, many authorities (EU, USA) require that the 
security plans are made in accordance with Part B. (Jones 2006, 113.) The ISPS code applies to 
passenger ships and high-speed passenger craft, cargo ships of 500GTs and above and mobile 
offshore drilling units. The code also applies to port facilities serving such ships engaged in 
international voyages. (McNicholas 2008, 93.) 
The code contains regulations for maritime security situations. Maritime security measures are the 
measures that the government, port operators, shipping companies and other interested parties 
must take when examining, evaluating, and preventing activities caused by a variety of criminals 
targeting vessels and port facilities operating in international traffic. The code is designed to detect 
and assess situations that threaten security. It is therefore possible to take preventive measures 
in situations that threaten the international ship traffic and port facilities. In addition, the code 
contains regulations and details the responsibilities of concerned parties. According to the code’s 
regulations, information concerning the security is integrated and should be available to all parties. 
The code is used to create requirements for different levels of security. (Söderblom 2004.)
Security level has an essential significance in the ISPS code (Söderblom 2004).The Maritime 
Security Measures identify three levels of risk. These risk levels are used internationally (IMO 
2012, 34-35):
“Security level 1 means the level for which minimum appropriate protective security measures 
shall be implemented at all times.
Security level 2 means the level for which appropriate additional protective security measures 
shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of the heightened risk of a security incident.
Security level 3 means that level which further specific protective security measures shall be 
maintained for a limited period of time when security incident is probable or imminent 
although it may not be possible to identify a specific target.”
6.4 The security of supply chain
The security of supply chain is the physical flow and information flow between the origin and the 
customers. There is no benefit to the supply chain if certain links or stakeholders operate more 
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efficiently than others; the total performance from the origin to the end user is the relevant matter. 
Each link within a supply chain is dependent on the previous links. (Banomyong 2005, 4.)
The security of the supply chain is managed with The US container security initiative (CSI), The 
US Customs Initiative on Supply-Chain Security or Customs’ Trade Partnership against Terrorism 
(C-TPAT) and EU Authorized Economic Operator (AEO).
The US container security initiative (CSI) consists of the following four core elements 
(Banomyong 2005, 9): 
1. “to establish security criteria to identify high risk containers;
2. to pre-screen those ocean going containers identified as high risk before they arrive at US ports;
3. to use advance technology to quickly pre-screen high-risk containers;
4. to develop the use of smart and secure ocean going containers.” 
The US Customs Initiative on Supply-Chain Security or Customs’ Trade Partnership against 
Terrorism (C-TPAT) has been implemented in many countries due to the fact that several US 
importers and their suppliers have been “advised” to join this initiative. (Banomyong 2005, 10.)
“C-TPAT recognizes that customs can provide the highest level of security only through close cooperation 
with the ultimate owners of the supply chain, importers, carriers, brokers, warehouse operators and 
manufacturers. Through this initiative, Customs is asking business to ensure the integrity of their security 
practices and communicate their security guidelines to their business partners within the supply chain.” 
(Hauser, Graham, Koerner, & Davis. 2004, 23.)
C-TPAT is the inspiration for the AEO system. AEO’s main purpose is to create secure transport 
chains as part of the fight against terrorism and to facilitate international trade. An economic 
operator may voluntarily apply for AEO status in order to gain simplified customs procedures 
and / or facilitations of customs control inspections. There are three types of AEO: 1) Customs 
Simplifications, 2) Security and safety, and 3) both Customs Simplifications and Security and 
Safety. (Kuronen & Tapaninen 2007, 31.)
C-TPAT and AEO have certain differences. AEO combines the security with the use of simplified 
procedures of customs clearance. In addition, the AEO applies to both exports and imports, 
while the C-TPAT only covers the export of the United States. C-TPAT is best suited for large 
companies, but AEO is intended for small and medium-sized enterprises. (Kuronen & Tapaninen 
2007, 38.)
6.5 Automatic Identification System (AIS)
It can be said that the availability of information about a ship to other ships and the coastal 
authorities increases maritime security. Automatic identification system (AIS) automatically 
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provides information about a ship to other ships and to the coastal authorities. The requirement 
became effective for all ships by 31 December 2004. AIS must be maintained in operation at all 
times unless international agreements, rules or standards require the protection of navigational 
information. (IMO 2013.)
The regulation requires that AIS shall (IMO 2013):
• “provide information - including the ship’s identity, type, position, course, speed, navigational 
status and other safety-related information - automatically to appropriately equipped shore  
stations, other ships and aircraft;
• receive automatically such information from similarly fitted ships; monitor and track ships;
• exchange data with shore-based facilities.”
Long Range Identification and Tracking system (LRIT). Regulation concerning Long Range 
Identification and Tracking system (LRIT) entered into force at the beginning of 2008 with 
the purpose to improve maritime security. In the LRIT system, the contracting parties share 
information about the vessels moving in the high seas for search and rescue purposes. LRIT is 
included in SOLAS Chapter V (Safety of Navigation). In the LRIT, vessels are required to report 
their identity, location, and the time and date of the location. LRIT system is not connected to the 
vessel’s automatic identification systems (AIS systems). The information provided by LRIT is more 
confidential than that of AIS and it is distributed only to the receivers specified in the regulation. 
In addition, national governments can only receive LRIT information from the vessels that are 
more than 1000 nautical miles from the coast of the country. (Kuronen & Tapaninen 2007, 29.)
The main purpose of LRIT is to enable a contracting government to obtain ship identity and 
location information in sufficient time to evaluate the security risk posed by a ship off its coast and 
to respond, if necessary, to reduce any risks. It is mandatory to have LRIT in all passenger ships, 
high speed craft, mobile offshore drilling units and cargo ships of over 300 gross tonnes. (EMSA 
2013.)
6.6 Maritime education
Maritime education can be considered an important security measure because the education 
addresses, for example, the key issues of the ISPS Code and security management methods. Also, 
the awareness and skills related to safety and security matters that are adopted during the years of 
training are a necessary basis when managing security risks.
Nowadays, maritime education and training has been expanded to cover all onboard duties, and 
working in the field requires the completion of maritime education. The qualifications and degrees 
earned in vocational schools and universities form the basis for the occupational education and 
training. As for higher education, universities and colleges are parallel but have different profiles 
and functions. (Anttila & Salmenhaara 2010, 27.)
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Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW 
Convention) has had its own impact on the educational legislation, structure of degree and 
training programs, content of education, equipment and tools for the education, teachers and 
other staff of educational institutions, as well as co-operation and networks. The convention 
defines the mandatory minimum requirements in the field, such as the health condition 
requirements for the professionals working in the field, the amount of sea service, and the 
standards for certificates and qualifications. (Anttila & Salmenhaara 2010, 30.)
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7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The main aim of the study was to reflect what actions are needed for the development of 
comprehensive safety and security in the maritime sector when security threats are also taken into 
account in risk management. First, some general aspects on maritime security were discussed. 
Next, the collection of material and definition of maritime security threats were presented. Finally, 
the most important maritime security measures were presented.
7.1 Discussions
Material for this study was collected by means of theme interviews, a web-based survey, Delphi 
study and workshops. This study is a review of security issues in the Baltic Sea region. In particular, 
the study is focused on Finland. For this study, a list of threats was formed, and the threats were 
examined on a general level. MIMIC WP3 is concentrated on the study of security threats mainly 
at a strategic level.
The topic of the study was diverse and multidimensional, so only a general overview of the threat 
categories was presented. Therefore, more research is needed in the future. During the study, it 
was noticed that the security issues are quite challenging to study because the threats are somewhat 
sensitive and often not openly discussed. In some cases emotional attitude diminished the 
importance of expert opinions. Discussion on security issues demands an atmosphere of trust and 
openness. It would also be easier to conduct further studies with the help of a person who has to 
classified data.
One way to promote trust is to allow the respondents comment anonymously. Delphi method has 
such a feature, and this was one reason the method was employed in this study. To some extent, 
the method produced desired results if they are compared with the findings of the interviews. 
The main findings are the same, but for example, the likelihood of terrorism was clearly higher 
(possible) than in the interviews (unlikely). We assume that it was easier to increase the estimation 
when answering anonymously. On the other hand, anonymity also increased the number of 
emotive comments. An opportunity to comment freely and at the same time unload feelings 
is a good way to approach a difficult issue, but the process should continue until a common 
understanding of the issue is reached. However, we did not fully reach this goal because of the very 
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busy schedule of the respondents. It is understandable that there are only a few experts in this field, 
and naturally they have only limited time for this kind of studies.
Another aim of this MIMIC WP 3 study was to analyze collected threats by using the model 
developed in the project (see Chapter 5). The method and theory used in the model development 
were similar to those used in other parts of the MIMIC project (Bayesian Belief Network). The 
model could be then connected with the other models. The main aim of the security threats 
analyzing model was to conduct analysis of all the identified threats at the same time and estimate 
the likelihood for example of an illegal action that might cause an oil spill. The aim and also the 
developed model present a very ambitious task. However, there is still much development work 
to do and we would like to proceed carefully. Resources reserved for the MIMIC project were 
insufficient when compared to the scope of the study, and that is why we could not analyze the 
collected threats as systematically as we expected. The model development should be continued by 
a future study.
7.1 Conclusions
The results of the study show that: the smuggling of weapons and drugs, thefts, vandalism, 
human trafficking and smuggling of humans, violent crimes, illegal fishing, illegal discharges and 
illegal environmental activism occur in the Baltic Sea region. 
According to the results of the study, it can be said that growing problems in the Baltic Sea are 
smuggling of drugs, smuggling of weapons and human trafficking. The probability of terrorism is 
very low, but attacks conducted by some unorganized individuals should be considered possible. 
Drugs move around the Baltic Sea. Most drugs are transported in containers, Ro-Ro and Ropax 
vessels because contraband cargo is easier to hide onboard these vessels than for example onboard 
tankers. Due to the free movement of goods inside the Schengen area, the transportation of drugs 
in smaller packages with passengers is becoming a growing trend. Generally, smuggling is not a 
problem to seafaring unless it remains uncovered during the transportation. Drug smuggling is a 
major problem for the society.
According to the authorities, weapons are smuggled on a larger scale and more systematically 
than previously assumed. Human trafficking occurs in the Baltic Sea and apparently it is a greater 
problem than is publicly admitted. However, human trafficking is not a problem from maritime 
point of view. Victims of trafficking are most likely transported with the status of legal passengers, 
and the truth is revealed only at the destination. The coordination of standards and practices, as 
well as the creation of trusted networks is required to improve and increase situational awareness. 
Maritime security measures have been examined with authorities and maritime experts. It is 
obvious that management methods for security threats vary slightly depending on the threat 
type. However, surveillance was mentioned by the experts as being the most essential maritime 
security measure. Cooperation between maritime law enforcement authorities of the Baltic States 
is considered good, and there is no need to significantly change security measures. However, 
according to the discussions with authorities, the unattainability of necessary information is one 
of the most significant security threats. Not all information is available for every authority, and 
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the collection of information is challenging. This challenge should be the first to be tackled in the 
near future. In addition, closer cooperation and clarification of task sharing could improve the 
preparedness.
In conclusion, networking between different stakeholders is very important when improving 
maritime security management. All in all, situational awareness and collaboration both nationally 
and internationally can be regarded as good maritime security measures. The Baltic Sea is a 
politically stable area, and unless this changes there are no triggers for security threats. However, 
the future is difficult to predict, and no threat should be omitted from the preparations plans.
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APPENDIXES
Appendix 1. Introduction of MIMIC project
Minimizing risks of maritime oil transport by holistic safety 
strategies” (MIMIC)
The partners of the project are Kotka Maritime Research Centre, Centre for Maritime Studies at 
the University of Turku, Kymenlaakso University of Applied Sciences, Aalto University, University 
of Helsinki, Tallinn University of Technology, University of Tartu, Swedish Meteorological and 
Hydrological Institute and Finnish Environment Institute. The cost estimate for MIMIC project 
is approximately 2 million euros, and its duration is from May 2011 to the end of 2013. The 
project is funded by the European Union and it has been approved to be one of the EU flag ship 
projects. The financing comes from the European Regional Development Fund, The Central 
Baltic INTERREG IV A Programme 2007-2013, Centre for Economic Development, Transport 
and the Environment of Southwest Finland (VARELY), the City of Kotka, Kotka-Hamina 
Regional Development Company (Cursor Oy), Kymenlaakso University of Applied Sciences, 
Finnish Environment Institute, University of Tartu, Tallinn University of Technology, and Swedish 
Meteorological and Hydrological Institute.
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Appendix 2. “Threat credibility model” variables (Tuominen, 2013)
Variable name Description States
Actor type Categories characterizing potential 
performer(s) of illegal acts.
(Distribution of potential performer(s) of 
illegal acts into distinctive categories)
Insider (employee, contractor)
Vessel
Individual
Criminal
Vandal/saboteur
Activist/activist group
Org crime group/network
Terrorist group/network
….
Actor motive(s) Foreseen main motive(s) active in an actor 
type category to enter into illegal acts in the 
given context
None
Social
Economical 
political
Ideological
Ethnical/religious
Frustration/anger
peer credit
…
Actor objectives Foreseen aim(s) in an actor type category 
regarding the outcomes of the illegal acts
Human casualties
Material damage, destruction
Disruption of operation
Financial loss
Intimidation, fear
publicity
Influence in public opinion
political influence/change
peer respect
Financial benefit
Social change
Infiltration of arms/operatives
…
Actor capabilities Foreseen level of actor skills and possession 
of (or access to) means/ resources needed for 
execution of the threat types
Low
Moderate
good
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Variable name Description States 
Actor type 
 
Categories characterizing potential 
performer(s) of illegal acts. 
(Distribution of potential 
performer(s) of illegal acts into 
distinctive categories) 
Insider (employee, contractor) 
Vessel 
Individual 
Criminal 
Vandal/saboteur 
Activist/activist group 
Org crime group/network 
Terrorist group/network 
…. 
Actor motive(s) 
 
Foreseen main motive(s) active in 
an actor type category to enter into 
illegal acts in the given context 
None 
Social 
Economical  
Political 
Ideological 
Ethnical/religious 
Frustration/anger 
Peer credit 
… 
Actor 
objectives 
 
Foreseen aim(s) in an actor type 
category regarding the outcomes 
of the illegal acts 
Human casualties 
Material damage, destruction 
Disruption of operation 
Financial loss 
Intimidation, fear 
Publicity 
Influence in public opinion 
Political influence/change 
Peer respect 
Financial benefit 
Social change 
Infiltration of arms/operatives 
… 
Actor 
capabilities 
 
Foreseen level of actor skills and 
possession of (or access to) 
means/ resources needed for 
execution of the threat types 
 
Low 
Moderate 
Good 
 
 
Threat type 
 
General categories of potential 
intentional harmful acts or illegal 
exploitations applicable to marine 
transportation 
Destruction/damaging 
Sabotage/disrupting of oper. 
Hijacking/seizure of vessel 
Cyber attack 
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Threat type general categories of potential intentional 
harmful acts or illegal exploitations applicable 
to marine transportation
Destruction/damaging
Sabotage/disrupting of oper.
Hijacking/seizure of vessel
Cyber attack
piracy
Theft (things, info)
Violence on persons
Kidnapping
Intentional pollution
Smuggling of goods/persons
…
Target type Categories of potential targets for 
the intentional harmful acts or illegal 
exploitations in the maritime context
Oil terminal
Cargo terminal
passenger terminal
passage infra/equipment
Crude oil tanker
Oil product tanker
Chemical tanker
Bulk carrier
general cargo vessel
Container vessel
passenger vessel/ferry
…
Target  
characteristics
Characteristics of potential target systems 
that determine the value of a target for 
the potential actors; e.g. monetary value, 
passenger capacity, damage/loss potential, 
public interest, etc.)
Target  
vulnerabilities
Description of the various protective 
measures/controls implemented in the 
potential target systems and evaluation of 
their expected status and effectiveness in 
preventing or mitigating the act.
Intervention  
capabilities
Foreseen capability of external actors 
(authorities, other vessels) for timely 
intervention to prevent/terminate or 
mitigate the act.
No/poor
Moderate
good
Location Location for the illegal act against the 
selected target
port/terminal
Coastal fairway
Open sea
wInside assistance If the actor has somebody inside the target 
system/organisation 
providing information or assisting in the 
illegal act.
Yes
No
Target  
attractiveness
How well target characteristics correspond to 
actor objectives.
No/Low
Moderate
High
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Odds for success Likelihood perceived by the actor for 
successfully executing an illegal act related to 
the threat type.
Minimal
Reasonable
Fair
Maximal
Risk of detection Likelihood perceived by the actor of getting 
caught, read-handed or afterwards, of the 
illegal act .
No/Low
Moderate
High
Commitment to act Actor is committed/ready to execute the 
illegal act related to the threat type i in the 
target type j
Yes (j,i)
No
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